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Articles
Privacy Limitations On Civil Discovery
In Federal and California Practice

JOHN SWANSON*

Recently, a federal district court sitting in New York ruled unconstitutional portions of a New York City ordinance which required
various public officials to disclose certain details of their personal
finances.' Like many counterparts enacted throughout the country,
this statute sought to facilitate the identification by the city of potential conflicts of interest on the part of its employees. 2 Of course, it
is not extraordinary for the federal judiciary to declare state and local
statutes and ordinances unconstitutional; what was extraordinary about
this case was the rationale upon which the court based its exercise
of judicial review.
The theory upon which the district court based its order was that
the disclosures required by the statute violated the constitutional
guarantee of privacy.' The court explicitly held that the Constitution
protects individuals from compelled disclosures of certain types of
*

A.B. Stanford University, 1982; J.D. School of Law (Boalt Hall), University of Califor-

nia, Berkeley, 1985. Associate, Diepenbrock, WuIff, Plant & Hannegan, Sacramento, California. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Prof. Ronan E. Degnan, who suggested
the topic and counseled the preparation of this paper.
1. Slevin v. City of New York, 551 F. Supp. 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
2. Id. at 917.
3. Id. at 934-49.
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unprivileged information at the order of the government in a civil
proceeding.' The opinion is exceptional because the court systematically
explores all the possible bases of this right in the text of the Constitution and purports to find the source of that right.
This case and others provide a helpful analogy for another closely
related question which is the focus of this paper: what impact do
privacy rights have on existing civil discovery practice? The discovery
provisions of the modern Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and many
state counterparts were designed and adopted long before the recent
rise of privacy to constitutional status. As will be demonstrated, the
development of this new right appears to require some reevaluation
of the federal and California rules of procedure.
For the purpose of this inquiry, this paper will be divided into two
main parts. Part I presents the existing federal and California constitutional law of privacy in the context of civil discovery. This part
briefly identifies these constitutional rights and, to the extent possible, derives coherent rules about their impact on civil discovery practice from pertinent case law.5 Part II offers existing case-law interpretations of the federal and California rules of procedure that those
respective courts might adopt in order to further protect the privacy
interest of individuals involved in litigation.
PRIVACY INTERESTS IN CivIL LITIGATION

In federal and California practice since 1938 and 1957, respectively,
it has been beyond cavil that discovery is a tool which the courts
administer in a generous and liberal fashion. 6 The command of both
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the California Code of Civil

Procedure is that discovery be allowed of all facts "relevant to the
subject matter" of an action.' Treatises on federal practice echo the

4. Id.
5. This paper will not address the extant philosophical literature which attempts to develop
a definition of privacy in abstract and generalized terms. The interested reader may begin a
study of that subject with the following articles: Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C. R.C. L. L. REV. 233 (1977); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLum. L. REv. 1410 (1974);
Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275 (1974); Kurland, The Private, TuE
UNIvERsnTY oF CHICAGO MAGAZINE 7 (autumn, 1976); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967);
Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L. J. 475 (1967); Ruebhausen and Brim,Jr. Privacy and Behavioral
Research, 65 COLuM. L. REV. 1184 (1965); Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REv.
343 (1915); and generally, XIII Nomos (1971).
6. See generally Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) and Greyhound Corp. v. Superior
Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355 (1961).
7. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(b)(1) and CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. §2016(b).
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statement that doubts about discovery should generally be resolved
in favor of its allowance.8
These expansive procedures were, of course, novel developments
in 1938 and 1957. Earlier practice made only limited use of depositions and interrogatories to adverse parties and third parties. The
advantage of expanded discovery in terms of judicial economy and
prevention of unfair surprise constituted an impetus for its adoption
in both the federal and California systems.
Since 1957, however, there has arisen in both state and federal constitutional law an increasingly acute concept of individual privacy.
Numerous courts, grappling with the nature of the privacy right,
remark that it is still largely undefined.9 Despite the manifest difficulty of formulating any concrete definition of this right, however,
both federal and California courts find it among those guaranteed
by their respective constitutions. The analysis of privacy issues by those
courts provides authoritive guidance as to the legal significance of
privacy in relation to disclosure of information in discovery.
A.

Federal Doctrine

An understanding of the federal view of privacy probably best begins
with consideration of Whalen v. Roe'0 and Nixon v. Administrator
of General Services, ' two United States Supreme Court cases dealing
with the right of an individual to prevent or curb the collection by
government process of personal information. Although these cases are
somewhat complex in factual terms, they deserve close attention.
Whalen v. Roe involved the question of whether the state of New
York could constitutionally record, in a centralized file, the names
and addresses of all persons who obtained, through a doctor's prescription, certain drugs for which there were both lawful and unlawful
markets. This information-gathering scheme, created by statute, sought
to provide law enforcement authorities with better information in their
campaign to reduce trafficking in illegal drugs. The Supreme Court
upheld the statute against the objections of doctors and patients that
their rights of privacy were infringed. The Supreme Court explained
its conception of privacy as follows:
8. See 8 C. WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §2007 (1970 and
Supp. 1984); 4 J. MOORE & J. LucAs, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE Paras. 26.55 and 26.56 (1984).
9. Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F. 2d 1119, 1127 (5th Cir. 1978); Slevin v. City of New York,
551 F. Supp. 917, 927-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); White v. Davis 13 Cal. 3d 757, 773 (1975); Valley
Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 656 (1975).
10. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
11. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
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The cases sometimes characterized as protecting "privacy" have in
fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and
another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions.' 2
In a footnote to this passage, the court defined "certain kinds of
important decisions" . . . as "matters relating to marriage, procrea-

tion, contraception, family relationships and child rearing and
education." 3 The court observed that "[iln these areas, it has been
held that there are 4limitations on the States' power to substantively
regulate conduct.'1
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, the ex-President
argued privacy as an objection to a federal statute providing for the
seizure and sorting of his presidential papers by federal archivists.
Commingled with official papers were, allegedly, others documenting
"extremely private communications between him [Mr. Nixon] and,
among others, his wife, his daughters, his physician, lawyer, and
clergyman, and his close friends, as well as personal diary dictabelts
and his wife's personal files.""' The court conceded that [o]ne element of privacy has been "characterized as '[t]he individual interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters'. . . ".6 The court then
weighed the public interest in allowing archival screening of the
Presidential materials of the Nixon administration" against the competing interest in privacy and concluded that the archival process was
a reasonable device for the resolution of the conflict.'
From these two cases, there emerges a discrete concept of the federal
constitutional right(s) of individual privacy. Specifically, that right
involves both an individual interest in "autonomy" in the sense of
freedom from regulation of certain conduct, and an interest in "confidentiality" in the sense of non-disclosure of confidential or personal
information. Each of these branches implies certain limitations on
civil discovery.
1.

The Autonomy Interest and Civil Discovery

Admittedly, of the two wings of privacy doctrine set forth in Whalen
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

429
Id.
Id.
433
Id.
Id.
Id.

U.S. 598, 599-600 (1977).
at 600 n. 26.
U.S. 425, 459 (1977).
at 457.
at 458-65.
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and Nixon, that involving protection of "certain important decisions"
seems less relevant to discovery. In a discovery or subpoena dispute,
an assertion of privacy amounts to an argument that certain information should not be disclosed by the person holding the information to the person seeking it. This notion of privacy contrasts with
that of the autonomy wing, which constitutes an objection to statutes
and other state action(s) regulating conduct. Accordingly, the doctrine has seldom been argued as an objection to information disclosure.
In Whalen, the appellant challengers argued that the New York
statute would deter individuals from seeking medical help.' 9 The Court
declined to embrace this argument on the ground that no significant
deterrance existed on the facts of the case.20 The circuit and district
courts, for their part, have had little experience with this question.
The Fifth Circuit, however, confronted this argument head on in Plante
v. Gonzalez,2' a case involving a Florida statute imposing financial
disclosure requirements on various elected officials. 22 The Fifth Circuit was aware that the Supreme Court had clearly indicated that fmancial decisions were not among the "certain important decisions"
immune from regulation. 23 Nevertheless, the appellants valiantly tied
their argument to those "certain important decisions" by asserting
that disclosure of their finances under the statute would impermissably
impact the way family and personal decisions were made.2" This argument found some support in the fact that the statute required
2
disclosures to the public at large, and not just to selected officials. 1
The court characterized this point as an assertion that disclosure "might
deter some decisions, ' 26 apparently with the same effect as an outright
statutory prohibition against those decisions.
The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument on the basis that the
required disclosures impacted those decisions less seriously than many
other permissible forms of government regulations. The court made
the following observations of Supreme Court privacy decisions:
The Court has limited the horizontal reach of the privacy right in
similar situations. In Whalen v. Roe, the Court assumed that pro-

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

429 U.S. 589, 602-03 (1977).
Id. For its part, Nixon is not apposite to the autonomy wing of privacy doctrine.
575 F. 2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978).
Id.
Id. at 1128-32.
Id.
Id. at 1136-37.
Id. at 1131.
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tection of the autonomy right could extend to decisions concerning
medical care. It recognized that the state law requiring that records
be kept concerning some drug prescriptions had discouraged the use
of those drugs. This was held to have insufficient effects on the
patients' decisions to constitute an invasion of the patients' rights.
Similarly, in PlannedParenthoodof Central Missouri v. Danforth,
the Court upheld record-keeping requirements for abortions over an
objection that this would be governmental interference with the
woman's choice. Finally, in Poelker v. Doe, Maher v. Roe, and Beal
v. Doe, the Court held that neither states participating in the medicaid
program nor cities operating municipal hospitals need provide free
abortions to indigent women. Although the cost of an abortion
operates as a much stronger influence on the choice involved than
does financial disclosure in this case, the Court held that government actions which did not work as a bar to abortions would not
be subject to scrutiny. If such strong secondary effects on family
do not demand scrutiny, this financial disclosure law cannot 7require
a close examination because of its impact on the family."
The possibility remains that actual or threatened information
disclosure may indirectly have the same impact on a particular activity
(form of conduct) or decision as a statute directly outlawing that
activity or pre-empting that decision. Inasmuch as one purpose of
penal statutes is deterrence of particular conduct or results, the prospect of compelled disclosure of information relating to that conduct
or those results might just as effectively deter such activities or decisions as a statute making them illegal. This might be the case, for
example, if government process were used to compel disclosure of
the sordid details of an abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy.
In Roe v. Wade,2 8 the court established that women have a constitutional right to choose to have such abortions; because disclosure of
such information to a sufficiently large audience would curtail a
woman's willingness to exercise this right, such a disclosure, arguably,
is constitutionally impermissible. Similarly, discovery requests for
information relating to "certain important decisions" may be constitutionally objectionable, depending on the degree of deterrent effect
they generate. Discovery requests may thus seek disclosures so severely
affecting protected autonomy interests as to require denial of the
request. Subsequent to Whalen and Nixon, however, no case denying
discovery on these grounds has been decided.
27.

Id. 1132-32 (citations omitted).

28.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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2.

The Confidentiality Interest and Civil Discovery

In the context of a discovery dispute, the other branch of federal
privacy doctrine, the confidentiality interest, facially appears the more
apposite to disputes over whether and to what extent information
should be disclosed. The extant case law in this area reveals the features
of the right to confidentiality as a federal constitutional doctrine.
In Whalen, the Supreme Court considered the appellant's confidentiality and autonomy arguments simultaneously. The Court rejected
both in a single analysis on the grounds that (1) the intrusion into
privacy resulting from the New York program was no greater than
many other intrusions ordinarily associated with the receipt of medical
services, (2) a substantial number of people seemed undeterred from
requesting medical assistance, and (3) the state had the power to prohibit all use of the drugs whose prescription required reporting.2 9
Among these reasons, only the first is responsive to an allegation that
a confidentiality interest has been infringed. The fact that no substantial
deterrence occurred speaks to the automony interest, not any right
of confidentiality, and the possibility of a state prohibition of the
use of particular drugs is likewise not relevant to constitutional confidentiality rights, especially when no such prohibition in fact exists.
More persuasive in regard to confidentiality is the idea that many
disclosures similar to those required by the New York statute routinely
occur as a necessary concomitant of the receipt of medical services.
As the Court pointed out in Whalen, the intrusions resulting from
the statutory program were not "meaningfully distinguishable from
a host of other unpleasant invasions of privacy [apparently permissible ones] that are associated with many facets of health care." 3 The
Court, in effect, said that the confidentiality interests presented did
not rise to constitutional heights. This finding may be paraphrased
as the idea that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed. Indeed,
this interpretation of how the Court characterized the confidentiality
interest is the only explanation for the failure of the Court to reach
the next logical question of the case: the determination of the
appropriate standard of review of government intrusions into constitutionally cognizable confidentiality interests. 3'
29. 429 U.S. 589, 602-04 (1977).
30. 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).
31. Justice Stevens' use of authority to support his analysis further suggests that this interpretation of the opinion's conception of confidentiality interests is the correct one. The footnote, id. at 599 n. 25, which purports to state the authoritative basis of the constitutional
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Both the logic of this opinion and the authorities cited therein in-

dicate that the Fourth Amendment law of search and seizure is the
principle source of the constitutional right of confidentiality. The pertinent authorities cited by the court involve Fourth Amendment law,
and the strongest, and perhaps the only tenable, argument for the
result reached is that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed.

Of course, the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy is one
of the fundamental elements of Fourth Amendment search and seizure

law.
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services32 further supports this
view. In that case, the Court assumed without much analysis (and
perhaps arguendo) that the ex-President had privacy interests of con-

stitutional dimensions in the non-disclosure of the various documents
at issue.3 3 The Court disposed of the privacy argument by balancing
the competing interests for and against disclosure,3 4 and in so doing,
cited several leading Fourth Amendment cases. 3" The balancing test
is the standard under which courts review the "reasonableness" of
Fourth
police searches. 6 Thus, Nixon is a strong indicator that the
3
Amendment is the source of the right of confidentiality. 1
interest in confidentiality, after a ritualistic reference to the dissent of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), cites Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), and California
Banker's Assn. v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). In Stanley, the court struck down a Georgia
statute that made possession of obscene material a crime; the opinion noted in passing that
state control over the availability and consumption of "ideas" implicated individual autonomy
interests, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969), but the holding rested solely on the First Amendment,
id. at 565-68. This reference to Stanley, thus, is somewhat oblique. On the other hand, California
Banker's Assn. was a case in which various banks challenged a statute requiring them to provide records and information about certain transactions to the Treasury Department, 429 U.S.
589, 602 n.25 (1977). The appellants' argument therein was that the statute constituted an
unreasonable search, 416 U.S. 21, 67-68 (1974), but the court never reached the merits of that
claim because none of the appellants had standing to raise it, id. at 68-69. CaliforniaBanker's
Assn. speaks of privacy in the sense of Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
government investigations.
32. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
33. Id. at 457-59.
34. Id. at 458 "[a]ny intrusion [into the appellant's privacy] must be weighed against the
public interest in subjecting the Presidential materials of appellant's administration to archival
screening. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1733-36, 18 L.Ed.2d
930 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)." Id.
at 458.
35. See supra note 34. Just before the passage quoted in footnote 34, supra, the court
also said: "We may assume with the District Court, for the purposes of this case, that [the
existing] pattern of de facto Presidential control [of the documents in issue] and congressional
acquiescence gives rise to appellant's legitimate expectation of privacy in [the materials at issue
in the case]. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511-12, 19 L.Ed.2d
576 (1967)." 433 U.S. 425, 457-58 (1977).
36. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
536-37 (1967).
37. This interpretation finds more and less explicit acceptance by lower federal courts.
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Closer to the civil discovery setting, two cases make the reasonable
expectation of privacy and the balancing test central features of their
analysis of privacy objections to administrative subpoenas. In United
States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,38 the United States attorney
sued to enforce subpoenas issued by the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to Westinghouse Corp. in
connection with an investigation of health and safety conditions at
a Westinghouse facility. NIOSH specifically sought medical files of
employees, and Westinghouse objected, urging the privacy interests
of its employees. The Third Circuit recognized that constitutional confidentiality interests were involved, stating "[t]here can be no question that an employee's medical records, which may contain intimate
facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials
entitled to privacy protection. ' 39 This statement amounts to a finding
that the employees had a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the
contents of their medical files. The court then balanced the competing
interests for and against disclosure to reach a decision in favor of
enforcement of the subpoena.4"
In E. L du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Finklea,41 a case involving
a similar NIOSH proceeding, a district court in West Virginia relied
exclusively on Whalen to find that disclosure of employee files to
NIOSH did not tread upon any reasonable expectation of privacy.

In Slevin, though the district court did not ground its analysis of confidentiality interests in
the Fourth Amendment, it interpreted Whalen as holding that "[i]nessence, the law did not
affect a reasonable expectation of privacy, because limited disclosure of potentially embarassing medical information is 'often an essential part of modern medical practice,"' Slevin v.
City of New York, 551 F. Supp. 917, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The District Court claimed that
the Supreme Court's opinion in Whalen v. Roe "firmly established," id. at 927 n.9, that the
source of the constitutional right of confidentiality was "the fourteenth amendment's guarantee
of the substantive liberty interest in privacy." Id. at 927. While this statement may be accurate
with respect to the source of the right to individual "autonomy," it is clearly erroneous to
the extent it also purports to identify the source of the right of "confidentiality." Indeed,
the district court's own opinion undercuts such a proposition when it observes that the analysis
of confidentiality interests in Whalen centered on whether "a reasonable expectation of privacy"
existed as to the information in issue, id. at 929, and that the same analysis in Nixon pivoted
on the reasonableness of the intrusion into the ex-president's "legitimate expectation of privacy"
as to the materials there in issue, id. at 930. In Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir.
1978), the court phased its analysis of confidentiality rights in terms of whether the appellants
entertained a "legitimate expectation of privacy" as to the financial information whose disclosure
the Florida statute required, id. at 1135. It also explicitly justified its endorsement of that
statute on the grounds that elected officials could reasonably expect less privacy than ordinary
citizens, id. at 1135-36.
38. 638 F.2d 570 (3rd Cir. 1980).
39. Id. at 577.
40. Id. at 578-80.
41. 442 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.W.Va. 1977).
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The court in Finklea asserted, contrary to Westinghouse, that
employees could not reasonably expect that their files would remain
confidential as against a NIOSH investigation. 2
Finally, it seems logical that the Fourth Amendment should be the
source of constitutional privacy limitations in civil discovery. If the
Fourth Amendment bars unreasonable intrusions by the state into areas
in which individuals entertain reasonable expectations of privacy, then
the same amendment should also prevent such intrusions when the
government acts as an agent for a private principal.43 The discovery
provisions of the modern rules of procedure enable civil litigants to
invoke judicial power to compel the production of information, under
penalty of sanctions for failure to comply. Such coercive power is
state action even when exercised by a private litigant. Indeed, without
the discovery provisions, no civil litigant could ever compel production of information on a routine basis. Therefore, subjecting a civil
litigant to all the restrictions applied to government efforts to obtain
information is entirely appropriate since the litigant is elevated to the
controls of the governmental discovery apparatus.
In this connection it is important to remember that routine discovery
is a relatively modern innovation. Prior to 1938 and 1957, federal
and California practice, respectively, allowed discovery only in unusual
circumstances. Consequently, the issue of privacy limitations on
discovery is a recent development, since the problem did not exist
until recently. Presently, the logical way to deal with the problem
is to extend the Fourth Amendment law of search and seizure to cover
"searches" through discovery by private litigants of their opponents
and third parties.
3.

Indicia of Privacy Interests

Plainly, the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy is an
intuitive one that is inherently difficult to define in concrete terms.
Quite literally, a reasonable expectation of privacy exists whenever,
in a normative sense, ordinary people think it should. Notwithstanding
this common sense of the concept, federal courts seem to inform their
intuition on this subject by reference to various discrete indicators
of privacy interests. Understanding authorities that have been or could
be persuasive as to the existence of reasonable expectations of privacy
42.

Id. at 825.

43.

See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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is helpful for purposes of predicting what courts will do in this area.
First, federal courts find a strong inference in favor of reasonable
expectations of privacy when the information in question is of a type
which, if possessed by a government agency, would be exempt from
the disclosure provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. 4 In
Slevin v. City of New York the district court noted that "lt]he Freedom
of Information Act, and analogous state and local laws, all contain
provisions limiting public access where information might compromise
privacy interests." 4 5
The opinions in Westinghouse Electric Corp. and E.I. du Port de
Nemours were more explicit. In the former case the court buttressed
its finding that employees had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in their medical records by citing the Freedom of Information Act:
Medical files are the subject of a specific exemption under the
Freedom of Information Act. [citations omitted]. This difference in
treatment reflects a recognition that information concerning one's
body has a special character. The medical information requested in
this case is more extensive than the mere fact of prescription drug
usage by identified patients considered in Whalen v. Roe and may
be more revealing of intimate details. Therefore, we hold that it falls
46
within one of the zones of privacy entitled to protection.
Since the Freedom of Information Act is a Congressional pronouncement, the sensitivity to individual privacy expressed therein commanded
great respect from the court, even in an argument by analogy.
The court in E. L du Pont de Nemours made slightly different
use of the Freedom of Information Act. That court held that disclosure
of medical files to NIOSH alone infringed no reasonable expectations
of the employees, but went on to rule that NIOSH could not
disseminate that information to third persons as follows:
[S]ubsection 552(b)(6) of the Freedom of Information Act contains
a specific exemption for personal and medical files and similar files
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted inva-

44.

5 U.S.C.A. §552(b)(l)-(9) (West 1983) in pertinent part reads:
...(2) (material) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of

an agency; ... (4)

trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained

from a person and privileged or confidential; (5)
memorandums or letters which would not be available
an agency in litigation with the agency; (6) personal
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
sonal privacy.
45. 551 F. Supp. 917, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
46. 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3rd Cir. 1980).

inter-agency or intra-agency
by law to a party other than
and medical files and similar
unwarranted invasion of per-
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sion of privacy. . . . The court holds that such disclosure would
constitute such invasion of personal privacy. Therefore, NIOSH
would be prohibited by law from releasing the protected informapersonnel files, or disclosing same
tion gathered from the medical4 and
7
to any unauthorized persons.
Again, the exemptions to the disclosure provisions of the Act provided
guidance as to the existence of protected privacy interests.
Another potent indicator of privacy interests in the discovery context has heretofore gone unnoticed by the federal courts, but could
nevertheless be effectively argued. Specifically, the federal judiciary
has long accepted the propriety of permitting litigants, especially plaintiffs, to sue under pseudonyms in cases implicating "matters of a
sensitive and highly personal nature." ' In the federal forum, plaintiffs may sue under assumed names in birth control cases,4 9 abortion
cases, 5" homosexuality cases,"' and cases involving illegitimate children
or children whose fathers have abandoned them.5 2 In cases in which
only economic interests or professional reputations are at stake,

however, the federal courts ordinarily refuse to allow use of assumed
names on the ground that the same privacy interests are lacking."
4.

The Significance of the Scope of Dissemination of
Information Obtained Through Discovery

Various federal court opinions indicate that the degree of intrusiveness in discovery requests relates directly to the foreseeable scope
of dissemination of the information obtained. These same courts
further hold that stronger interests must be shown to authorize
discovery in which the information obtained will foreseeably be
disseminated more broadly. In short, the foreseeable degree of
dissemination is an important aspect of the magnitude of the intrusiveness of a discovery inquiry.
47. 442 F. Supp. 821, 825 (S.D.W.Va. 1977).
48. Free Mkt. Compensation v. Commodity Esch., 98 F.R.D. 311, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
49. E.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
50. E.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
51. E.g., Doe v. Dep't of Transp., Fed. Aviation Admin., 412 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1969);
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975);
Doe v. Chafee, 355 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
52. E.g., Doe v. Carleson, 356 F. Supp. 753 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Doe v. Gillman, 347 F.
Supp. 483 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Doe v. Lavine, 347 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
53. Free Mkt. Compensation v. Commodity Exch., 98 F.R.D. 311, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
Doe v. Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652 (D. Mont. 1974); accord S. Methodist Univ. Ass'n. of Women
Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 712-13 (5th Cir. 1979).
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Regrettably, the judgment and opinion of the case most clearly

articulating this idea was vacated by the District of Columbia Circuit
in Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co. 4 on March 15, 1984, pending

rehearing en banc. 55 The case involved a third party's motion for a
protective order preventing public disclosure of discovery materials
sealed because of their commercial sensitivity to the movant, Mobil

Oil Corp. The underlying suit was a libel action by an officer of Mobil
against the Washington Post. Mobil became entangled in the litiga-

tion on the basis of subpoenas served upon it.
The opinion in that case clearly articulates the proposition that
disclosure of "private" information to the general public requires

greater justification than disclosure to only state employees who are
under a duty of confidentiality.

6

In this connection, the court noted

that the "fact that measures were taken to guard against such public
dissemination figured importantly in the holdings [of Whalen and

Nixon] favoring disclosure to the respective agencies." 7 The Court
further observed that broader dissemination of information constituted
a "more severe intrusion on confidential matters." 8
The rules stated in Tavoulareas were foreshadowed in earlier federal
court opinions. As the court suggests, the Supreme Court opinions

discussing privacy attached significance to the likely scope of dissemination of the information in issue. In Whalen, the organization of the

court's opinion reflects this notion. Justice Stevens divided the discussion in that case between, on one hand, the dangers posed to privacy
by public dissemination of the information gathered and on the other,

the intrusion into privacy attendant to disclosure to state officials
alone. 9 As mentioned, the court found the latter constitutionally unob54. 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Rehearing en banc granted March 15, 1984; judgment
and opinion vacated).
55. The en banc disposition came on June 25, 1984, Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co.,
737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1984), but it provides little guidance. Apparently the en banc panel
perceived the main issue of the case as the First Amendment question of public access to discovery
materials: the panel remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration in light of Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S.Ct. 2199 (1984). Over the dissent of two judges, the court
refused to reinstate the opinion of the original three judge panel on the ground that nothing
in Seattle Times "suggested that Fourth Amendment privacy interests mandated . . . the protective order" upheld therein. 737 F.2d at 1172. In short, the presence of First Amendment
interests in these cases seems to have clouded the identification of Fourth Amendment privacy
interests. No reason exists to believe the original three judge panel's opinion should be discounted, in cases in which free speech concerns do not arise, inasmuch as the opinion constitutes a statement about Fourth Amendment privacy interests in discovery.
56. 724 F.2d at 1020.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1977).
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jectionable because, in effect, no reasonable expectation of privacy
existed as to disclosure to the state alone. 6 As to the former, however,
the court said:
Public disclosure of patient information can come about in three
ways. Health Department employees may violate the statute by failing, either deliberately or negligently, to maintain proper security.
A patient or a doctor may be accused of a violation and the stored
data may be offered in evidence in a judicial proceeding. Or, thirdly,
a doctor, a pharmacist, or the patient may voluntarily reveal information on a prescription form.
The third possibility existed under the prior law and is entirely
unrelated to the existence of the computerized data bank. Neither
of the other two possibilities provides a proper ground for attacking
the statute as invalid on its face. There is no support in the record,
. . . or in the experience of assumption that the security provisions
of the statute will be administered improperly. And the remote
possibility that judicial supervision of the evidentiary use of particular items of stored information will provide inadequate protection against unwarranted disclosures is surely not a sufficient
reason
61
for invalidating the entire patient-identification program.
A clear negative inference from this lengthy discourse is that the
prospect of widespread public disclosure of the prescription information would have made the New York program constitutionally
impermissible.
In Nixon, the analysis of the Court was based on the same logic:
[The privacy interest asserted by appellant is weaker than that found
wanting in the recent decision of Whalen v. Roe, supra. Emphasizing the precautions utilized by New York State to prevent the
unwarranted disclosure of private medical information retained in
a state computer bank system, Whalen rejected a constitutional
objection to New York's program on privacy grounds. Not only does
the Act challenged here mandate regulations similarly aimed at
preventing undue dissemination of private materials but, unlike
Whalen, the government will not even retain long-term control over
such private information; rather, purely private papers and recordings
62
will be returned to appellant ....
Again, the degree of intrusiveness varies with the foreseeable magnitude
of dissemination of the personal information involved, and by negative

60.

Id.

61. Id. at 600-02 (footnotes omitted).
62. 433 U.S. 425, 458 (1977).
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inference, greater public interests must be demonstrated to justify broad
dissemination.
Plante v. Gonzalez6 3 is further authority for the same proposition.
The court in Plante explicitly observes that "[the Supreme Court]
distinguished disclosures to employees of the state, who are under
a duty to keep information obtained confidential, from disclosures
to the public."" However, as the court in Tavoulareas observed, the
Fifth Circuit, "after recognizing that financial privacy is a 'matter
of serious concern, deserving strong protection,' . . . concluded that
the public interest in [public] disclosure [of personal finances] for
elected officials was even stronger.''65 Westinghouse Electric Corp.
is consistent with this view of the role of such protective orders. In
that case, the court ordered deletion of names and identifying
characteristics as a prerequisite to disclosure by NIOSH of the medical
information in issue to any third parties." Deletion of names is a
rather clever alternative to a complete bar to dissemination, but it
is consistent with the notion that some such order curtailing foreseeable
dissemination must be forthcoming before courts will permit the inquiry
to go forward.
Finally, the Tavoulareas court could have cited Slevin and E. L
du Pont de Nemours, discussed above, as further support for the same
views. The opinion in Slevin flatly states that "[tihe degree of intrusion stemming from public disclosure of the details of a person's life
is exponentially greater than disclosure to government officials." 6' 7
E. L du Pont de Nemours is an almost perfect example of this principle in operation. That court permitted NIOSH access to employee
medical files with the proviso that there be no disclosure of their contents to the general public, as, for example, through the Freedom
68
of Information Act.
In summary, courts are not without power to affect the foreseeable
degree of dissemination of information obtained through civil discovery
and subpoena. Tavoulareas plainly demonstrates this; to the extent
a protective order limits use of discovery materials to litigants and
their counsel and, then, only for the purposes of the litigation, the
order substantially reduces the intrusiveness of discovery. 6 A given
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

575
Id.
724
638
551
442
724

F.2d 1119, (5th Cir. 1978).
at 1133.
F.2d 1010, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
F.2d 570, 580 (3rd Cir. 1980).
F. Supp. 917, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
F. Supp. 821, 825 (S.D.W.Va. 1977).
F.2d 1010, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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discovery request or subpoena, apparently, is permissible only when
such a protective order eliminates any foreseeability of disclosure to
third parties; in that case these courts find the balance tips in favor
of discovery.
B.

California Doctrine

California Constitution, Article 1, Section 1 provides: "All people
are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among
these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety,
happiness, and privacy."7 Privacy was added to this list of inalienable
rights by popular vote in 1972. Prior to that time, the state constitution made no explicit mention of privacy as a protected right.
In the absence of any specific legislative history, the California
Supreme Court has looked to the arguments included in the voter's
pamphlet distributed in that election to develop this somewhat cryptic
reference to privacy into a workable legal doctrine.7" In this connection, the California Supreme Court has interpreted this constitutional
guarantee of "privacy" to include three distinct aspects. In White
v. Davis,7" a case involving police surveillance of college classes without
a search warrant, the court explained the meaning of the right of
"privacy" found in Article 1, Section 1 as follows:
Several important points emerge from this election brochure "argument," a statement which represents, in essence, the only "legislative
history" of the constitutional amendment available to us. First, the
statement identifies the principal "mischiefs" at which the amendment is directed: (1) "government snooping" and the secret gathering of personal information; (2) the overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary personal information by government and business
interests; (3) the improper use of information properly obtained for
a specific purpose, for example, the use of it for another purpose
or the disclosure of it to some third party; and (4) the lack of a
reasonable check on the accuracy of existing records. Second, the
70. Emphasis added.
71. In white v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775 n.11 120 Cal. Rptr. 96, 106 (1975), the Court
said: "California decisions have long recognized the propriety of resorting to such election
brochure arguments as an aid in construing legislative measures and constitutional amendments
adopted pursuant to a vote of the people. (See, e.g., Carter v. Com. on Qualifications, etc.
(1939) 14 Cal. 2d 179, 185, 93 P.2d 140; Beneficial Loan Society, Ltc. v. Haight (1932) 215
Cal. 506, 515, 11 P.2d 857; Story v. Richardson (1921) 186 Cal. 162, 165-66 198 P. 1057
110 Cal. Rptr. 881)."
72. 13 Cal. 3d 757 (1975).
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statement makes clear that the amendment does not purport to prohibit all incursion into individual privacy but rather that any such
intervention must be justified by a compelling interest. Third, the
statement indicates that the amendment is intended to be selfexecuting, i.e., that the constitutional provision, in itself, "creates
a legal and enforcebable right of privacy for every Californian. 7' 3
Clearly, the concept of privacy found in Article 1 differs substantially from its federal counterpart. First, this notion of privacy focuses
soley on access to "personal information" in the sense of facts that
are confidential. In relation to federal privacy doctrine, the California right of privacy most closely resembles the "confidentiality" wing
described above.
Further, the right of privacy described in White v. Davis explicitly
places limits on "the use of information properly obtained for a
specific purpose." In other words, this constitutional right separately
and independently limits the ability of the government and perhaps
private party accomplices to distribute or disseminate "confidential
information," even when that information has been obtained without
any violation of privacy. This treatment is in contrast with the federal
concept of the right of confidentiality, in which the foreseeability of
dissemination is an aspect of the "reasonableness" of a particular
intrusion into privacy or, alternatively, the "reasonableness" of a
particular expectation of privacy is considered in relation to a given
intrusion. Thus, federal doctrine mixes the questions of initial disclosure
with considerations of dissemination, whereas California law treats
the two as separate issues.
Third, the California Supreme Court clearly indicates that strict
scrutiny is the standard of review applicable to efforts to obtain confidential information. The federal standard is the Fourth Amendment
balancing test, as described above. Although, as yet, the lower California courts and even the state Supreme Court apparently recognize
no particular distinction between this balancing test and the requirement that a compelling state interest justify any intrusions into
privacy,74 strict scrutiny may entail a more difficult showing than that
73. Id. at 775. The full text of the arguments in that brochure can be found in Appendix A.
74. Some California courts articulating the standard of review applicable to cases under
Article 1, Section 1 observe that an intrusion into privacy requires the showing of a compelling
state interest, but then paradoxically, the opinions state that a balancing or weighing of the
competing interests is the appropriate standard. These cases include: Board of Trustees v. Superior
Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 516, 525, 174 Cal. Rptr. 160, 164 (Ist Dist. 1981)(discovery sought
into personnel files); City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. App. 3d
879, 882, 178 Cal. Rptr. 435, 437 (Ist Dist. 1981)(discovery sought into personnel files); Jones
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required to satisfy a balancing test."'
1.

The Threshold Requirement: A Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy

In applying the principles of Article 1, Section 1, as deduced by
the California Supreme Court, one District Court of Appeal recently
summarized the import of the right of privacy in the context of
discovery as follows:
During the early years following the enactment of California's 1957
discovery statute, courts operated generally upon the assumption that
all-out discovery at the earliest time was the highest good. But
experience through the years has exposed the unnecessary hardship
and expense which have become the all too common consequences
of unregulated discovery. The adoption of the constitutional right
of privacy emphasizes the duty of the courts to protect both parties
v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 550, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148, 158 (1st Dist. 1982) (discovery
sought into gynecological history). Another set of cases holds that strict scrutiny is the appropriate
standard (i.e. require a compelling state interest). Those cases include: Fults v. Superior Court,
88 Cal. App. 3d 899, 903; 152 Cal. Rptr. 210, 212 (1st Dist. 1979) (discovery sought into history
of sexual relations); Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherandini, 93 Cal. App. 3d 669,
677-81, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55, 60-62 (4th Dist. 1979) (discovery sought into medical information);
Rietz v. California Camino Bank, 154 Cal. Rptr. 3, 11-12 (Ist Dist. 1979) (discovery sought
into financial records) (when it declined to hear the case, the Supreme Court ordered that
the opinion not be officially published); Willis v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 277, 297,
169 Cal. Rptr. 301, 312 (2nd Dist. 1980) (discovery sought into attorney's client files); Morales
v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 283, 290, 160 Cal. Rptr. 194, 198 (5th Dist. 1979) (discovery
sought into extramarital sexual conduct). Another line of cases adopts the balancing test: Jacobs
v. State Bar, 136 Cal. Rptr. 920, 926-27 (1st Dist. 1977) (not published officially) reversed
on other grounds 20 Cal.3d 191, 141 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1977) (discovery sought into attorney's
client files); Doyle v. State Bar, 32 Cal. 3d 12, 20; 184 Cal. Rptr. 720, 724 (1982) (discovery
sought into attorney's client files); Rifkind v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 1045, 1050,
177 Cal. Rptr. 82, 84 (2nd dist. 1981) (discovery sought into financial information). Last, but
certainly not least, the California Supreme Court has twice stated that the balancing test is
the appropriate standard of review, contrary to its position in White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d
757 (1975). Those two cases are: Doyle v. State Bar, 32 Cal. 3d 12, 20; 184 Cal. Rtpr. 720,
724 (1982) (discovery sought into attorney's client files); and Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior
Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 657, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553, 555 (1975) (discovery sought into financial
records). Thus, divining any coherent view of the California courts as to the appropriate standard of review under Article 1, Section I is difficult.
75. Compare Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1984):
On the basis of this case law [Whalen, Nixon, Plante, and Westinghouse], we adopt
a balancing approach in determining the lawfulness of intrusions on protected nondisclosure rights. Such a balancing standard should afford necessary flexibility in serving
conflicting interests in disclosure and confidentiality. We add, however, that our adoption of a balancing approach does not preclude in all circumstances the government's
need to present a compelling interest to justify an intrusion. Indeed, when the intrusion is severe, a compelling interest is required to justify the intrusion. "Severe"
intrusions include public dissemination of confidential information as opposed to
disclosure of such information only to the government or litigants.
The other federal cases discussed above employed only a balancing test.
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and nonparties against unnecessary intrusions
into matters which
76
people ordinarily consider to be private.

As the last sentence of this passage indicates, numerous California
courts begin their application of Article 1, Section I to the civil

discovery setting by posing the threshold question of whether an
individual entertains a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the
information sought through discovery or subpoena.
The very fact of this threshold inquiry distinguishes post-1972 prac-

tice from earlier law. Under the well known rule of Greyhound v.
Superior Court,7 7 any discovery broadly "relevant to the subject
matter" 7 8 of a suit was almost automatically permissible, subject only

to the proviso that privileged information could not be obtained. Under
Article 1, Section 1, the finding that an individual has a reasonable

expectation of privacy as to the information sought precludes discovery
upon a mere showing of the relevance of that information to the sub-

ject matter of the suit. The constitutional right of privacy has reversed the presumption of discoverability of information relevant to the
subject matter of lawsuits in a number of factual scenarios. A review
of the situations in which courts have employed this new rule is
instructive. 9
FINANCIAL INFORMATION

In cases in which discovery of personal financial information is
sought, the California Supreme Court has said that bank customers
enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy as to financial information
held by their banks.8" This right exists as against both government
and private party efforts to obtain financial information, 8 ' and the
76. Rifkind v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 1051-52; 177 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85
(2nd Dist. 1981) (discovery sought into financial information).
77. 56 Cal. 2d 355, 15 Cal. Rptr. 50 (1961).
78.
79.

CALIF. CODE OF CIV. PROC. §2016(b).
See generally, Matzger: Discovery and the Right of Privacy: Applying the Brakes to

Greyhound, 5 S.F. BAP J. 11 (No. 11 Nov. 1980).
80. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 656, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553,
554 (1975).

81. Rietz v. California Camino Bank, 154 Cal. Rptr. 3, 10 (Ist Dist. 1979) (not officially
published) (reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records exists as against Franchise Tax
Board investigation); Doyle v. State Bar, 32 Cal.3d 12, 19-20, 184 Cal. Rptr. 720, 723-24
(1982) (reasonable expectation of privacy in financial records exists as against State Bar investigation); Rifkind v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 1050, 177 Cal. Rptr. 82, 84-85
(2nd Dist. 1981) (reasonable right of privacy exists in financial information as against discovery
in a divorce proceeding); Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 313, 316, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 4, 6 (2nd Dist. 1982) (private financial information is within constitutional privacy protection as against discovery request investigating damages resulting from alleged commercial injury);
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right may be asserted even if the individual is not dealing with an
institutional entity. The court makes clear that ". . . an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy to materials he submits to
third parties." 8 2 Further, when the information is sought about the
financial affairs of business enterprises, each of the partners or
participant owners has a reasonable expectation of privacy as to their
interest in the venture, although their finances are commingled with
those of the business entity.8 3
Moreover, when discovery into finances is sought to be justified
as relevant to the ability to pay damages, the same reasonable expectation of privacy exists irrespective of the substantive claims asserted
in the litigation. Contrary to practice prior to 1972, the statement
of a claim for punitive damages does not automatically entitle the
plaintiff to immediate discovery into the personal finances of the
defendant. 8 4 Finally, in attorney-client relations, attorneys possess a
"right . . . to maintain reasonable privacy regarding their financial
and business affairs, which right extends to their files for particular
clients against state bar investigations."" As one court of appeal stated,
however, "the expectation of privacy by a client merely as to his identity and the fee charged, . . . is in most circumstances probably
nonexistent." 8 6
For present purposes, the important principle exhibited by each of
these cases is that the finding of a reasonable expectation of privacy
reverses the presumptive discoverability of unprivileged information
relevant to the subject matter of the action. Each court found that
Article 1, Section 1 required further analysis of the question of
discoverability in terms of privacy rights.

Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 265, 273, 150 Cal. Rptr. 77, 81 (2nd Dist.
1978) (protected personal information includes financial information as against discovery based
on statement of a claim for punitive damages).
82. Jacobs v. State Bar, 136 Cal. Rptr. 920, 926 n.2 (1st Dist. 1977) (not officially
published) (State Bar investigation of an attorney's clients' expectation of privacy extends to
confidential materials given to doctors and lawyers).
83. Rifkind v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 177 Cal. Rptr. 82 (2nd Dist. 1981) (in
divorce proceedings, spouse of partner sought discovery into financial affairs of the partnership).
84. Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 265, 272, 150 Cal. Rptr. 77, 81 (2nd Dist.
1978); Cobb v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 543, 550-51, 160 Cal. Rptr. 561, 566-67 (2nd
Dist. 1979).
85. Jacobs v. State Bar, 136 Cal. Rptr. 920, 927 (1st Dist. 1977) (not officially published).
86. Willis v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 277, 297, 169 Cal. Rptr. 301, 312 (2nd
Dist. 1980).
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SEXUAL RELATIONS

Using as their touchstone federal constitutional limitations on the
ability of the states to regulate sexual conduct, California courts infer
a state constitutional interest in the confidentiality of sexual matters.
In a paternity suit, the woman whose pregnancy is the subject matter
of the proceeding has a reasonable expectation of privacy in "the
names and addresses . . . of all persons with whom . . . [she has]

been romantically or sexually involved . . ." around the probable
time of conception.8 7 Similarly, a husband suing for the wrongful death
of his wife and alleging loss of consortium has a reasonable expectation of privacy in any extra-marital sexual relations he may have had,88
and that expectation is shared by the women, if any, with whom he
was involved.8 9 Finally, in suits for personal injury in which the plaintiff alleges that the use of defective drugs caused prenatal injury, the
plaintiff's mother, a third party to the action, has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the details of her obstetrical-gynecological
history.90
The recognition of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the facts
of each of these cases caused the courts to reject immediate discovery
based on the relevance of the information to the subject matter of
the suit. Although the court allowed discovery in some of these cases,
the discovery was permitted only after an analysis of the privacy
interests presented.
MEDICAL INFORMATION

In the area of medical information, California discovery practice
has been significantly influenced by the well-known case of Britt v.
Superior Court.9 ' In that case, the California Supreme Court denied
discovery of information not directly related to the injuries alleged
by a group of plaintiffs who sued a local airport on the basis of
its allegedly excessively noisy operations. Without reference to Article 1, Section 1, Britt and its progeny articulate a doctrine of limitation of discovery into medical information. The rationale of Britt was
87.

Fults v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. App. 3d 899, 902-05, 152 Cal. Rptr. 210, 211-24

(1st Dist. 1979).
88. Morales v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 283, 291-92, 160 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199
(5th Dist. 1979).
89. Id.

90. Jones v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 548-50, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148, 156-57

(Ist Dist. 1981).

91.

20 Cal. 3d 844, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1978).
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that a defendant's inquiry into medical facts not directly related to
the alleged injury deterred plaintiffs from asserting their rights in
court.9 2 In the context of discovery into medical information, Britt
protects plaintiffs from intrusive discovery tending to discourage them
from litigation, though the decision also leaves defendants unable to
establish pre-existing medical conditions as a basis for reduction of
damage awards.
Notwithstanding Britt, Article 1, Section 1 has crept into the law
of discovery of medical information. One court has held that medical
patients have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their records as
against an investigation by the State Board of Medical Quality
Assurance into the professional abilities of a physician.9 3 Although
the patients were third parties to the proceeding in that case, 94 a
litigants' expectations of privacy presumably would be no different.
In such cases, Article 1, Section 1 represents an alternative to the
Britt analysis that would prevent automatic discovery into medical
information based on the mere showing of relevance to the subject
matter of the case. 95
PERSONNEL FILEs AND ARREST RECORDS

California courts also hold that employees entertain a reasonable
expectation of privacy as to the contents of personnel files kept by
their employers. A criminal defendant accused of assaulting a police
officer who asserts provocation as his defense may not automatically
obtain discovery into the complaints in that officer's personnel files
with past employers.9 6 Similarly, in a libel action by a member of
a medical school faculty against the school and various faculty
members, where the gist of the alleged libel is that the individual defendants cast doubt on the plaintiff's scientific abilities, apparently both
the contributors to the file and the individual about whom the file
92. Id. at 706-08.
93. Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 680, 156
Cal. Rptr. 55, 62 (4th Dist. 1979).
94. Id. at 679, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
95. Notably, this subject matter area presents a clear opportunity for the comparison of
California privacy law and its federal counterpart, as articulated in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589 (1977), and the NIOSH subpoena cases described above. Unfortunately, the precedents
in both judicial systems do not appeal to easy comparison. Britt introduced an unusual exception into California privacy law. And, as described above, the federal precedents, seem to reach
conflicting results especially in the NIOSH cases. Perhaps time will bring the situation into
better focus.
96. City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. App. 3d 879, 882,
178 Cal. Rptr. 435, 437 (Ist Dist. 1981).
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is kept possess reasonable expectations of privacy as to the nondisclosure of the contents of the file." Finally, in the third-party case
where a criminal defendant seeks the names and addresses of
individuals arrested by a particular police officer in order to develop
a defense, the arrestees have a reasonable expectation of privacy
respecting the fact of their arrest.98
Although some of these examples involve criminal cases, the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy was the touchstone of
analysis in all, and that concept is easily transferable to the civil
setting.9 9 The significant feature of these cases, for present purposes,
is that the Greyhound rule of the presumptive discoverability of facts
is reversed by the finding of a reasonable expectation of privacy, which
necessitates inquiry beyond the mere question of the relevance of the
information to the subject matter of the action.
2.

Indicia of Privacy Interests.

Although recognition of a reasonable expectation of privacy constitutes a necessary first step in any analysis of privacy interests, the
concept is somewhat amorphous and difficult to define in generalized
terms. Several references routinely relied upon by courts to determine
the presence of reasonable expectations of privacy, however, are useful
for purposes of predicting when a court is likely to find a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
First, California courts apparently rely on the "autonomy" wing
of the federal right of privacy to find areas in which individuals enjoy
a state constitutional right of confidentiality. Specifically, various state
courts have taken the federal prohibition of regulation of sexual conduct as authorization for a right of confidentiality as to the same
matters. 0 Since U.S. Supreme Court case law extends such prohibitions against state regulation to "matters relating to marriage, . . .
family relationships, and child rearing and education"'' as well as
procreation and contraception,' 0 2 the California courts logically could
97. Board of Trustees v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 516, 526, 174 Cal. Rptr. 160,
165 (Ist Dist. 1980).
98. Craig v. Municipal Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 69, 77-78; 161 Cal. Rptr. 19, 23 (2nd
Dist. 1979).
99. For example, in subsequent 1983 suit by criminal defendants.
100. Fults v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. App. 3d 899, 902-05, 152 Cal. Rptr. 210, 211-14
(1st Dist. 1979) (discovery sought into identities of sexual partners in a paternity suit); Morales
v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 283, 289, 160 Cal. Rptr. 194, 197 (5th Dist. 1979)(discovery
sought into husband's extramarital sexual activities).
101. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.26 (1977).
102. Id.
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be expected to find a reasonable expectation of privacy in these areas
as well.
Aside from the logical symmetry of finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in these areas as well as in the area of sexual conduct, another argument in favor of this result is that the effectiveness
of the ban on state regulation in these areas is impaired if civil litigants
are able to use judicial process to compel disclosure of information
relating to the same matters. The deterrent effect of such disclosures
on the conduct sought to be insulated from government influence might
be just as great as that flowing from an outright state prohibition.
If the idea of the federal bar to state regulation is that the government should not affect people's lives in these matters, the notion of
a reasonable expectation of privacy in those areas aids in preventing
the governmental discovery apparatus from being used by civil litigants
to accomplish what the state is forbidden to accomplish directly.
Further, the analysis used by several California courts suggests that
the privacy provisions of the federal Freedom of Information Act and
the California Government Code are probative of the situations in
which reasonable expectations of privacy manifest themselves. Two
courts have relied upon the exemption from disclosure provisions of
the Freedom of Information Act and California Government Code
to support their findings that employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the contents of their personnel files.' " Both
courts quoted the passage of the Freedom of Information Act which
exempts from disclosure "personnel ...

or similar files, the disclosure

of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy" as
well as an identically-worded portion of the California Government
Code."'4 While these exemptions are the only ones utilized thus far
by California courts to deduce when reasonable expectations of privacy
exist, there is every reason to suspect that other statutory exemptions
may also provide guidance."'5
103.

Board of Trustees v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 516, 529, 174 Cal. Rptr. 160,

167 (1st Dist. 1981); City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. App.
3d 879, 882, 178 Cal. Rptr. 435, 437 (1st Dist. 1981).
104. CAL. GOVT. CODE §6254.
105. CAL. GOVT. CODE §6254 reads, in pertinent part:
Except as provided in Section 6254.7, nothing in this chapter shall be construed
to require disclosure of records that are any of the following:
(a) Preliminary drafts, notes, or interagency or intra-agency memoranda which are
not retained by the public agency in the ordinary course of business, provided that
the public interest in withholding such records clearly outweighs the public interest
in disclosure.
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The California legislature recently enacted a statute imposing new
limitations on the ability of civil litigants to obtain "personal records"
by subpoena duces tecum.' °6 California Code of Civil Procedure
Section 1985.3 requires that notice be given to the individual whose
records are sought by service of a subpoena on a third party custodian or keeper in sufficient time (at least 15 days) to allow that individual to bring a motion to quash.'0 7 The statute extends protective
coverage to the following:
Personal records [meaning] books, documents or other writings pertaining to a consumer and which are maintained by any "witness"
which is a physician, hospital, state or national bank, state or
federally chartered savings and loan association, state or federal credit
union, trust company, security brokerage firm, insurance company,
underwritten title company, attorney, accountant, institution of the
Farm Credit System, as specified in Section 2002 of Title 12 of the

United States Code, or telephone corporation which is a public utility,
as defined in Section 216 of the Public Utilities Code.0 8

(b) Records pertaining to pending litigation to which the public agency is a party,
or to claims made pursuant to Division 3.6 (commencing with Section 810) of Title
1 of the Government Code, until such litigation or claim has been finally adjudicated
or othervise settled.
(c) Personnel, medical, or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
(h) The contents of real estate appraisals, engineering or feasibility estimates and
evaluations made for or by the state or local agency relative to the acquisition of
property, or to prospective public supply and construction contracts, until such time
as all of the property has been acquired or all of the contract agreement obtained,
provided, however, the law of eminent domain shall not be affected by this provision.
(i) Information required from any taxpayer in connection with the collection of local
taxes which is received in confidence and the disclosure of the information to other
persons would result in unfair competitive disadvantage to the person supplying such
information.
(n) Statements of personal worth or personal financial data required by a licensing
agency and filed by an applicant with such licensing agency to establish his personal
qualification for the license, certificate, or permit applied for.
(o) Financial data contained in applications for financing under Division 27 (commencing with Section 44500) of the Health and Safety Code, where an authorized
officer of the California Pollution Control Financing Authority determines that
disclosure of such financial data would be competitively injurious to the applicant
and such data is required in order to obtain guarantees from the United States Small
Business Administration. The California Pollution Control Financing Authority shall
adopt rules for review of individual requests for confidentiality under this section
and for making available to the public those portions of an application which are
subject to disclosure under this chapter.
106. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§1985-1985.3.
107. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE §1985.3.
108. CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE §1985.3 (a)(1).
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The only District Court of Appeal to hear a pertinent case under
this statute' °9 observed that the section is probably a codification of
the rule in the Valley Bank of Nevada case, 1 0 which requires, as a
matter of state constitutional law, notice to bank customers of any
subpoenas of their records. Since that case relied upon Article 1,
Section 1,111 however, the new statute appears to attempt a listing
of at least some situations in which a reasonable expectation of privacy
arises and to provide a procedural format through which the right
of privacy may be asserted. Although the statute may not define all
the situations in which such privacy interests exist, even in the context of financial information, the section provides a plain indication
of when such interests are likely to be found by a court.
Finally, though California procedure apparently does not permit
litigants to proceed under pseundonyms or anonymous surnames," 2
a court might look to the above-referenced federal decisional law
respecting suit under pseudonyms to infer reasonable expectations of
privacy in appropriate cases.113
3.

The Distinction Between the Initial Intrusion into Privacy
and the Improper Dissemination of Information
Legitimately Obtained.

In White v. Davis, the California Supreme Court determined that
one of the principal "mischiefs" sought to be remedied by the passage
of Article 1, Section 1 was "the improper use of information properly
obtained for a specific purpose, for example, the use of it for another
purpose or the disclosure of it to some third party.""' 4 Lower courts
interpreting Article 1, Section 1 in light of White v. Davis find an
important distinction between the initial intrusion into privacy involved
in responding to discovery questions and the violation of privacy which
occurs when information properly obtained through such processes
is communicated to persons other than the parties and their counsel

109.
110.
111.
112.

Sasson v. Katash, 146 Cal. App. 3d 119, 194 Cal. Rptr. 46 (2nd Dist. 1983).
Id. at 124-25, 194 Cal. Rptr. it 49.
Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 656, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975).
California Rules of Court, Rule 201; CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE §442.40; 49 CAL. JUR

3d §74 Pleading at pp. 448-49 "[i]n
the complaint, the title of the action must include the
names of all the parties to the action.") Id. But see Central Valley Chap. 7th Step Foundation
v. Younger, 95 Cal. App. 3d 212, 157 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1979) (individual plaintiffs were allowed
to proceed under anonymous surnames).
113. See discussion of federal practice supra notes and accompanying text.
114. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
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for purposes other than use in the particular litigation. The distinction between these two privacy interests is, of course, quantitative
and not qualitative. The former is an interest in confidentiality as
against the world while the latter is an interest in confidentiality as
against the whole world, except the parties to a particular case and
their attorneys.
Privacy is seldom a successful objection when the objectant refuses
even to answer discovery inquiries. A discussion of the circumstances
in which such refusal prevails over the competing interest in factfinding
in connection with civil proceedings constitutes the bulk of Part II
of this paper; for immediate purposes it suffices to say that existing
case law overwhelmingly holds that disclosure of personal information to only litigants and their counsel for use in preparation of a
particular case is supported by the compelling state interest in "the
ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings."' 5 In
short, with certain limited exceptions, courts find that the societal
need for discovery prevails over the competing interests in privacy,
at least when the disclosures are directed only to litigants."16
Courts distinguish this interest in confidentiality as against the world
from the separate concept of an interest in preventing dissemination
of personal information beyond the parties to a particular case. In
a legal malpractice action alleging financial injury, where the defendants sought discovery into the plaintiff's financial condition and
announced their intention to distribute that information to "such other
persons 'related to the litigation to whom counsel for defendants believe
such dissemination is necessary for the purposes of preparing this
matter for trial,' "" the Second District Court of Appeals stated:
115. The first case to articulate this proposition was In Re Lifschutz, 2 Cal.3d 415, 432-33,
85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 840 (1970) (state's interest in facilitating ascertainment of truth in connection
with legal proceeding requires disclosure of confidential patient-psychotherapist communications). Since Lifschutz, numerous courts passing on privacy objections to discovery across diverse
factual settings have adopted this view, although not all have found that the balance tips in
favor of allowing discovery. Morales v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 283, 290, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 194, 198 (1979) (discovery sought into plaintiff-husband's extramarital sexual conduct
in wrongful death suit alleging loss of consortium); Fults v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. App.
3d 899, 904, 152 Cal. Rptr. 210, 213 (1979) (discovery sought into woman's sexual conduct
in a paternity suit); Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 657-58, 125
Cal. Rptr. 553, 556 (1975) (discovery sought into third party's finances); Moskowitz v. Superior
Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 313, 316, 187 Cal. Rptr. 4, 6 (1982) (discovery sought into financial

information); City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. App. 3d 879, 881-82,

178 Cal. Rptr. 435, 437 (1981) (discovery sought into personnel files); Board of Trustees v.
Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 516, 525, 174 Cal. Rptr. 160, 164 (1981) (discovery sought
into personnel files); Jones v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 550, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148,
157-58 (1981) (discovery sought into woman's gynecological history).
116. See Part II, infra for discussion of these exceptions.
117. Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 313, 315, 187 Cal. Rptr. 4, 6 (1982).
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Here, unlike the situation in cases such as Britt v. Superior Court,
supra, petitioner [the plaintiff-discoveree] does not seek to restrict
the scope of discovery, nor does he deny that real parties are entitled to discover the details of his financial affairs. Petitioner seeks
only to prevent disclosure of the personal financial information, contained in his deposition, to persons who have no legitimate interest
in its use for purposes of the litigation. Contrary to real parties'
[defendants'] contention, the fact that petitioner is attempting to
restrict the use of the facts discovered, rather than the scope of the
discovery itself, cannot justify denial of his constitutional right of
privacy in the financial information divulged in his deposition.
The manifest meaning of this analysis is that the individual interest
in privacy substantially outweighs any state interest in the disclosure
of materials obtained through discovery to persons other than the
litigants and their counsel.
Similarly, in a suit between two former partners in a law firm for
breach of contract where discovery was sought over various clients
and cases of the partnership, the court found that the state interest
in disclosure outweighed the interest of the clients in confidentiality.
However, after noting several cases involving limitations on discovery
posed by Article 1, Section 1, the court went on to hold:
While we agree with the trial court that discovery is warranted,
information of the nature requested should not be used by defendant or his counsel for any purpose beyond the restricted confines
of this litigation and should not be imparted to other persons beyond
the immediate needs of this controversy. If such a problem should
be perceived, plaintiff's remedy would be a motion for a protective
order to prevent such dissemination." 8
The court's extensive analysis of Article 1, Section 1 as a prelude
to this holding clearly indicates that the constitutional right of privacy
was the basis for the ruling.
Explicitly in these two cases and implicitly in others, the courts
balance the interests in disclosure against the interests in confidentiality as to non-participants in the litigation and find that the balance
tips heavily in favor of confidentiality. The noteworthy point is that
these courts undertook this balancing at all; California constitutional
law provides a separate and discrete right to maintain the confidentiality of information obtained through discovery in relation to persons other than the litigants and their counsel.

118.

Willis v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 277, 298, 169 Cal. Rptr. 301, 313 (1980).
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In the context of civil litigation, the constitutional right to limit
the dissemination of confidential personal information amounts to the
proposition that an individual about whom private information has
been obtained through discovery is presumptively entitled to a protective order limiting the distribution of that information to counsel
and parties solely for the purposes of the instant litigation. Perhaps
in light of the relative historic novelty of modern discovery, this rule
can be paraphrased as the idea that individuals have a reasonable
expectation that confidential information furnished in discovery will
be used solely for the ends of the litigation and otherwise will remain
confidential. This principle emerges from a review of existing case law.
In a case involving discovery into a defendant's financial status on
the ground that a claim for punitive damages had been alleged, the
District Court of Appeal articulated this concept clearly:
[D]isclosure of financial information in civil discovery related to a
cause of action seeking punitive damages presents a situation where
disclosure to counsel for the parties for the purpose of the lawsuit
is relevant to the public purpose served by judicial dispute resolution. So long as the disclosure is so limited, none of the evils to
which the California Constitutional declaration of the right of privacy
is addressed are present. .

.

. So long as the disclosure is limited

by a properly fashioned protective order, the invasion into privacy
is held within the limits required [by the Calif. constitution]. ' 19
In terms of remedial devices, the question of protective orders limiting
the dissemination of discovery materials correlates with the privacy
implications of such dissemination. The question of the permissibility
of the inquiry itself correlates with the privacy implications of disclosing
the information sought solely to the limited audience consisting of
the litigants and their counsel. As to the latter issue, this court found
that the public interest in effective judicial dispute resolution required
that the information sought be forthcoming. As to the former,
however, the court said:
We hence conclude that where a party is compelled in civil discovery
to reveal financial information because the information is relevant
to the subject matter of a claim for punitive damages, that party
is, upon his motion, presumptively entitled to a protective order that
the information need be revealed only to counsel for the discovering
party or to counsel's representative, and that once so revealed, the
information may be used only for the purposes of the lawsuit. The
119.

Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 265, 273, 150 Cal. Rptr. 77, 81 (1978).
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burden is upon the opposing party to establish a substantial reason
why the order should be denied. That reason must be related to
the lawsuit. 2
Numerous other cases involving diverse factual settings adopt the
same rule, albeit less articulately. In a state bar investigation of alleged
misconduct by a member, one court allowed subpoena of all files,
documents, and papers in the possession of the attorney relating to
a particular client, over the attorney's privacy objection on the basis
that the state bar's investigation was confidential.' 2 1 Such mandatory
confidentiality, of course, amounts to a de facto protective order.
Similarly, in another state bar investigation into an attorney's misappropriation of a client's funds, the Supreme Court enforced a similar
subpoena over the privacy objection of both the attorney and client,
reasoning that "all State Bar disciplinary proceedings, of course, are
conducted in strict confidence, thereby assuring that private financial
or other information contained in clients' files and records will not
be made public nor divulged to third persons. '
In a legal malpractice action in which the defendants sought financial information relevant to the damages claimed, the issue of privacy
arose on the plaintiffs' motion for a protective order limiting the use
made of the information obtained. 123 The plaintiff did not dispute
the defendant's right to that information. The court said:
Petitioner argues that he is presumptively entitled to a protective
order limiting dissemination of the financial information contained
in his deposition, and the burden therefore was on real parties to
show that such relief is not warranted. In support of this contention
petitioner cites Richards v. Superior Court [citation omitted], wherein
this court held: "[W]here a party is compelled in civil discovery to
reveal financial information because the information is relevant to
the subject matter of a claim for punitive damages, that party is,
upon his motion, presumptively entitled to a protective order that
the information need be revealed only to counsel for the discovering
party or to counsel's representative, and that once so revealed, the
information may be used only for the purpose of the lawsuit. The
burden is on the opposing party to establish a substantial reason
why the order should be denied. That reason must be related to
the lawsuit." While the protective order in Richards was sought by
a defendant against whom a claim for punitive damages was asserted,
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 272, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
Jacobs v. State Bar, 136 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1977) (not officially published).
Doyle v. State Bar, 32 Cal.3d 12, 21, 184 Cal. Rptr. 720, 725 (1982).
Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 313, 187 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1982).
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we think the holding of that case is applicable here, for even though
petitioner (the plaintiff) himself put in issue his financial worth, he
thereby waived his constitutional right of privacy only to the extent
necessary for a fair resolution of the action.' 2
Finally, cases which utilize devices other than protective orders to
finesse privacy problems in discovery are not inconsistent with this
proposition. Cobb v. Superior Court'2 5 involved another effort by
a plaintiff to obtain complete financial information about a defendant on the basis of a claim for punitive damages. That the defendant had a right to a protective order of the type described was not
questioned in the case. The opinion begins with a recitation that such
an order was granted. The court explicitly stated that "[s]ealing and
limited access [to discovery materials] should also be considered [as
a means of protecting privacy], the latter a mandatory requirement
under Richards if appropriate objection is made."' 2 6 The Cobb court
went on to refuse to compel even initial answers to questions regarding
finances until after the plaintiff had made a prima facie showing of
the right to punitive damages.' 2 7 This procedure seems dubious in light
of the important countervailing interest in disclosure of such information in order to promote early settlement in such cases, but no
part of the court's opinion undercuts the litigant's right to a protective order limiting dissemination of information legitimately obtained.
In fact, the explicit language of the opinion endorsed the Richards
approach.
Similarly, in Morales v. Superior Court, 2 ' a suit by a surviving
spouse for the wrongful death of the other spouse, the court required
the plaintiff to tell whether he had been having extramarital sexual
relations but refused to allow the disclosure of the identities of the
individuals with whom he had been involved if any. The deletion of
the names and identifying characteristics of third parties who have
in no sense waived their right to privacy avoids undue infringement
upon those rights. Allowing such deletions, however, is not inconsistent with the availability of protective orders of the type described.' 2 9
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 317-18, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 7-8.
99 Cal. App. 3d 543, 160 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1979).
Id. at 551, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
Id.
99 Cal. App. 3d 283, 160 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1979).
In Craig v. Municipal Court, supra note 98 at 69, where a criminal defendant accused

of assaulting an officer sought discovery into the identities of individuals arrested by the officer,

the court similarly denied the discovery because the matter of disclosure of identities was the
only question before the court.
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Finally, in Board of Trustees v. Superior Court,3 ' a libel plaintiff
sought discovery into his own and one of the individual defendant's
personnel files, which were maintained by a co-defendant medical
school. The court again granted the discovery, but with the proviso
that all names and identifying characteristics of the contributors to
the files be deleted. The issue of a protective order was not raised.
Hence, these cases are not inconsistent with the rule of Richards,
entitling individuals over whom discovery is sought to protective orders
limiting the dissemination of information obtained. While most courts
find that the interest in ascertaining truth in judicial and administrative
proceedings outweighs the individual's interest in complete confidentiality, those same courts hold that the constitutional right of privacy
is paramount to any other uses of the discovered information, since
the same compelling state interest is absent.
READING THE DISCOVERY RuLEs IN LIGHT OF
THE NEw RIGHT OF PRIVACY

As described above, in most instances it appears that privacy
objections to discovery are overcome by the entry of a protective order
limiting the dissemination of the discovery materials. Under California law, such a protective order is a constitutional requirement when
a reasonable expectation of privacy inheres in the information in question. In federal practice, the entry of such a protective order makes

a particular intrusion into privacy less severe and therefore reasonable
in light of the individual's expectation of privacy. Also, such techniques as the deletion of names and identifying characteristics are
available in both systems to reduce the impact of discovery upon
legitimately held expectations of privacy.
This state of the law, however, leaves open the questions of whether
and when discovery, even subject to such a protective order, is
impermissible as an invasion of privacy. Phrased simply, does an
individual have a privacy interest which protects him from even answering certain questions? At most, the law set forth above established
only that protective orders are necessary to eliminate invasions of
privacy. That law cannot reasonably be interpreted to mean that protective orders are always sufficient to meet privacy objections to
discovery. In both the federal and state judicial systems, the proper
test to resolve this question is some sort of balancing of interests,
130.

119 Cal. App. 3d 516, 174 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1981).
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and as a theoretical matter, the individual's privacy right clearly may
outweigh the need for discovery in instances in which the state interest
in disclosure is weak.
The difficulty in finding such a case, however, is that enabling the
parties to find new evidence and new legal issues pertinent to their
case is one of the great advantages of "broad" and "liberal" discovery.
The policy of modern discovery recognizes the great social utility in
permitting the parties to exhaustively explore facts which have only
an attenuated logical relation to the suit which originally provides
the foundation for that discovery. Indeed, putting aside considerations of efficiency and economy, the best way to avoid "trial by
ambush" would be to let the parties inquire into anything they wanted
to. Thus, the challenge to discovery jurisprudence is to articulate a
principled, instrumental test which identifies particular situations in
which the state interest in disclosure of private facts is too weak to
justify any intrusion.
A.

Federal Practice

Although the Rules of Civil Procedure contain no provisions concerning privacy as such, a party may obtain a protective order barring
discovery entirely'3 1 or circumscribing the permissible scope of
discovery,' 3 2 provided good cause is shown that the order is necessary
"to protect a party or person from annoyance [or] embarassment
"I".3As many participants in the litigation process are painfully
aware, however, this standard is not especially helpful in raising privacy
objections because the set of facts whose revelation is annoying or
embarrassing often includes those facts which are crucial to and
perhaps even determinative of the outcome of the litigation. Unfortunately, "annoyance or embarrassment," standing alone, constitutes
an overbroad description of the situations in which privacy interests
exist.
Hence, as a cursory review of treatises of federal practice will reveal,
the protective order provisions of Rule 26 are most often called upon
to remedy abuses of discovery which are basically clerical in nature,
such as redundant and excessively burdensome requests for
information.' The protective order provisions may have some value
131. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(4).
133. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
134. See 8 C. vRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§2036-45 (1970
and Supp. 1983); 4 J. MOORE & J. LucAs, MoOR's -FALPRACTICE Paras. 26.67- 26.76 (1983).
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to the privacy interests of nonlitigant third parties,' but those provisions are essentially silent as to protection for litigants from unnecessary discovery into personal matters when the information sought
is broadly "relevant to the subject matter of the action."' 3 6 In short,
these provisions do not make privacy a ground for objection to
discovery when the separate question of relevancy to the subject matter
has already been resolved in favor of disclosure.
The balance of Rule 26(c) provides no guidance as to how a court
might distinguish between permissible discovery requests and abusive
ones unduly infringing upon individual privacy. Furthermore, the
presence of improper motives on the part of the discoveror, which
might be seen as sufficient to trigger protections, is not only intractable as a judicial inquiry without endless discovery into those motives,
but also is likely to concur with valid grounds for legitimate discovery.
Moreover, in camera review of every such issue is not practicable as
a device for the routine resolution of such questions, especially when
answers to interrogatories or deposition questions are sought. If protection from disclosure of private information is to be forthcoming,
some other provision of the federal rules must furnish it.
Perhaps the judicial tool most commonly relied upon for denial
of discovery in federal practice is the ground that the information
sought is not relevant to the subject matter of the action. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking
discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party . . . . It
is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
As the advisory committee comments to this passage make clear the
scope of relevancy in discovery is broader than at trial, not being
38
confined to the issues to be presented in court.'
The last sentence of Rule 26(b)(1) is extremely important because,
135. Dart Industries Co. v. Westwood Chemical Co., 649 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1980),
citing Collins and Aikman Corp. v. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 51 F.R.D. 219, 221 (D.S.C.
1971): " '[T]here appear to be quite strong considerations indicating that ...

discovery would

be more limited to protect third parties from harassment, inconvenience, or disclosure of confidential documents."'
136. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1).
137. Id.
138. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b) advisory committee note, (1946 amendment to subdivision (b)).
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more clearly than any other provision unrelated to privilege in the
discovery rules, the sentence links relevancy in discovery to admissibility
under the Rules of Evidence. This reference constitutes an important
insight into the operation and function of discovery relevancy because
without it no clear guide to the meaning of "relevant to the subject
matter" of the action can be found. "Relevant to the subject matter"
does not explain how to distinguish between the potentially infinite
range of events which are logically related to a lawsuit and that subset
of those events which should, in light of practicability and other considerations pertinent to the function of courts and civil litigation, be
subject to discovery. Thus, only by the reference to the Rules of
Evidence can any meaning be made of the command of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) that discovery not be restricted to the issues
to be argued at trial.
The last sentence of rule 26(b)(1) is probably best interpreted, in
light of these considerations, as permitting discovery of any facts
directly admissible as evidence at trial as well as other facts which
may, under some plausible vision of the reality of the dispute, lead
to further facts themselves admissible. The argument has never been
made that discovery should not be allowed over unprivileged facts
directly relevant and admissible at trial. However, the proposition that
discovery should be allowed when "reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence" is not similarly time-honored:
the last sentence of Rule 26(b)(1) was added to the rules by amendment in 1946.
As the negative language of the sentence indicates, the Advisory
Committee sought, by this amendment, to eliminate an undesirable
trend then developing in case law that denied discovery unless the
evidence sought would be directly admissible at trial.' 3 9 The ancient
equity practice, as the committee noted in its comments, had been
to restrict discovery to facts in and of themselves admissible.'4 0 This
139. Id. The amendments to subdivision (b) make clear the broad scope of examination
and that [examination] may cover not only evidence for use at the trial but also inquiry into
matters in themselves inadmissible as evidence but which will lead to the discovery of such
evidence. The purpose of discovery is to allow a broad search for facts, the names of witnesses,
or any other matters which may aid a party in the preparation or presentation of his case
(citations ommited). In such a preliminary inquiry admissibility at trial should not be the test
as to whether the information sought is within the scope of proper examination. Such a standard unnecessarily curtails the utility of discovery practice. Of course, matters entirely without
bearing either as direct evidence or as leads to evidence are not within the scope of inquiry,
but to the extent that the examination develops useful information, it functions successfully
as an instrument of discovery, even if it produces no testimony directly admissible (citations
ommited).
140. Id.
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rule had never been widely observed as a bar to discovery in America,
where most judges sat in both law and equity even prior to 1938,
and many legislatures had already repudiated the rule when the
Advisory committee rejected it in 1946.141 The manifest purpose of

the change was to allow discovery into facts that, as the committee
put it, might uncover "leads" to other admissible evidence., 4" In so
acting, the committee did not consider how discovery to obtain "leads"
might ever be limited in any principled way. The concern of the authors
seems to have focused on maintaining discovery as a broad and liberal
tool.
One tenable construction of this provision is that the trial judge
may deny discovery of facts whose disclosure is not "reasonably
calculated" to produce admissible evidence. Most people would probably agree that limitation on this basis does not pose an onerous
burden on fact finding and the ascertainment of truth. The evidence
rules admit a wide range of information as hearsay exceptions, impeachment material, and under certain circumstances, even character
evidence. Given such generous standards, significant diminution of
fact finding from the adoption of this interpretation of "relevant to
the subject matter" in Rule 26(b)(1) is unlikely.
More pertinent to the issue at hand, however, Rule 403 of the Rules
of Evidence represents a tool for the protection of privacy. The rule
provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
While guided by the factors stated, the power of the court to exclude
evidence is well known as a substantially discretionary one, unlikely
to be overturned on appeal. By this rule, federal judges have the power
to exclude evidence which they feel would unduly slant or color a
case to the prejudice of one of the litigants. The implications of this
rule for discovery are manifest once the idea is accepted that a
necessary relation exists between admissibility at trial and relevancy
in discovery. In effect, Rule 403 serves as a source of judicial power
to bar discovery over particular topics on the ground that the court
would only reject any evidence gleaned from the inquiry because that
evidence would be unduly prejudicial to a party.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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In this view, Rule 403 is a useful device for the protection of privacy
in discovery because, empirically, matters may be extremely private
precisely because disclosure will be prejudicial to the individual about
whom the information relates in the eyes of others. Often, the reason
such information is sought is that it relates to and casts some aspersions on a litigant. As a statistical fact of life, the overlap between
the set of facts whose disclosure is an intrusion on a reasonable
expectation of privacy and the set of facts whose disclosure gives rise
to prejudice in jurors is substantial. The proposition, thus, is that
the evidentiary standard of prejudice should be used to evaluate assertions of privacy as a bar to discovery. The high correlation between
intrusions on reasonably held expectations of privacy and prejudice
in jurors supports the reasonableness of this proposition. In substantial part, one person's embarrassment and another's prejudice are two
sides of the same coin.
Such a rule preserves broad discovery because the standard of prejudice generally implicates a relatively narrow range of subject matter
areas, and under this rule, discovery is still available when likely to
lead to evidence which would not be excluded under Rule 403. At
the same time, by putting privacy questions in a specific factual context, this standard makes privacy determinations less problematical.
The test is a functional one that is already familiar to trial judges,
and has the further advantage of protecting much private information while stopping short of extending "protection" to individuals
who are unduly sensitive in a normative sense. Finally, and most important, this approach has the added attribute of only negligible
infringement upon the ability of litigants to vindicate their rights at
trial, since the trial court necessarily would reject any such facts actually offered in any trial. In terms of balancing privacy interests
against the societal interest in disclosure, this test identifies situations
in which a reasonable expectation of privacy is confronted by a de
minimus interest in disclosure of any sort.
Well-reasoned case law supports this interpretation. Specifically, in
the recent case of Priest v. Rotary,'43 a waitress alleged that her refusal
to submit to her employer's requests for sexual favors resulted in
dismissal from her job. In the action under title VII, the defendantemployer answered that the dismissal actually occurred because the
plaintiff had been trying to "pick up" male customers. No assertion
was made that the plaintiff was soliciting clients for prostitution. The
143.

98 F.R.D. 755 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
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defendant then sought "to discover detailed information about plaintiff's sexual history, including the name of each person with whom
she had sexual relations in the past ten years."' 44 Pivoting his analysis
on the last sentence of Rule 26(b)(1), Judge Henderson considered
every possible theory under which this information might have been
admissible. Borrowing the language of Rule 403 the court rejected
a number of these theories on the ground that facts adduced by such
discovery should not be admissible at trial because "[t]he probative
value of each of the suggested inferences is so weak that it could
not outweigh the obvious risk of prejudice which evidence about a
person's past intimate relationship entails."' 45 For this reason, discovery
was denied. Notably, the waitress in this case did not argue any constitutional theory of privacy rights. The court apparently invoked the
concept of prejudice in the sense of Rule 403 without realizing that
the concept reflected the substantial privacy interests present in the
case. A litigant such as this waitress could make her objections to
discovery more compelling by pointing out her privacy interests. The
case is extraordinary, though, because its analysis of the resolution
of a discovery dispute relies solely on the Rules of Evidence.
Another application of this analysis is found in Reeg v. Fetzer,'"
a medical malpractice case in federal district court on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction. In Reeg, the plaintiff sought discovery over
whether the attending physician had completed a particular medical
residency program. The court denied discovery into that matter on
the alternative grounds that the information sought was irrelevant to
the case and, more interestingly, that even if relevant, the information would only be excluded as unduly prejudicial under Rule 403.
The court explained this extraordinary use of the rules of Evidence
to resolve a discovery dispute as follows:
[A]s the pre-trial Order in this case indicates that Defendant
Shaughnessy was engaged in the general practice of medicine and
the duty and standard of care would be measured on such basis,
evidence as to his failure to complete a specialty residency training
would not only be irrelevant, but would possibly be prejudicial and

any probative value it might have would be far outweighed by the
prejudicial effect of same. Such evidence would be excluded by Rule
403 . . . . Looking back to the provisions of Rule 26(b)(1), supra,

144.
145.
146.

Id. at 756.
Id. at 760.
78 F.R.D. 34 (D. Okla. 1976).
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it does not appear that the information sought by Plaintiff to which

the instant Motion to Quash is directed is a proper subject of
discovery in this action. Said Motion which properly is considered
a Motion for Protective Order pursuant to Rule 26(c), Fed. Rules.
Civ. Proc. is sustained on the basis the Court finds the discovery

which is the subject of Plaintiff's Notice to Take Deposition filed
herein January 26, 1976, should not be had as the information sought

lacks the required relevance or if deemed relevant should be excluded on the basis of unfair prejudice and confusing and misleading
the jury. Rule 403, Federal Rules of Evidence."4 7
In an earlier portion of the opinion, the court rejected the defendant's argument that a federal statute relating to privacy rights in
information held by the registrars at medical schools created a
privilege.' 4 1 In 1976, when Reeg was decided, the Supreme Court had
not yet decided Whalen v. Roe or Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services. Consequently, the existence of a privacy interest in such
records, which are akin to personnel records, had moral but not legal
significance in the absence of any privilege.
Were Reeg v. Fetzer decided today, the court could reach the same
result by combining the presence of privacy interests with its point
about the prejudice arising from disclosure of that private information. The concern of this case with both privacy interests and prejudice to jurors again indicates that prejudice often results from
disclosure of information with respect to which the individual possesses
a reasonable expectation of privacy. Moreover, when the only
reasonably foreseeable product of a discovery effort is prejudicial information as in Reeg, no state interest supports that discovery, and
thus, intrusion on a legitimate privacy interest is improper.
B.

California Doctrine

As described above, most California courts find that inquiries into
an individual's private life, subject to appropriate protective orders,
are justified by the compelling state interest in the ascertainment of
truth in connection with legal proceedings. This determination is, in
theory, the product of weighing these competing interests on a case
by case basis. As in federal practice, the possibility remains open that
in a given case the interest in individual privacy may outweigh the
societal interest in the production of answers since the information
147. Id. at 37.
148. Id. at 36.
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sought would only be excluded at trial and is unlikely to lead to other
admissible evidence.' 4 9 In short, the same argument just made with
respect to federal practice could be made in a California court by
substituting, Section 352150 of the Evidence Code for Rule 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
In reality, however, the California courts, taking Article 1, Section
1 as their guide, embrace a much more broad doctrine of protection
of privacy expectations against disclosure to litigants. Three recent
cases have denied even initial inquiry into private affairs and, in so
doing, articulate an important new interpretation of the California
discovery statutes in situations implicating individual privacy.
In Board of Trustees v. Superior Court, 5 ' Justice Elkington read
the discovery statutes in light of Article 1, Section 1. That case was
a libel action by a medical school faculty member against a colleague
and the medical school. The basis of the alleged libel was that undue
aspersions had been cast on the plaintiff's scientific abilities. The school
objected to the plaintiff's attempted discovery of his own and the
individual defendant's personnel files kept by the school, on the basis
of Article 1, Section 1. The discoveree medical school specifically
argued that contributors to those files held a reasonable expectation
that the contents would not be disclosed outside the medical school
hierarchy. Predictably, the plaintiff responded that a compelling state
interest in the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings supported the request."5 2
Justice Elkington took note of these arguments and stated:
In an effort to reconcile these sometimes competing public values,
it has been adjudged that inquiry into one's private affairs will not
be constitutionally justified simply because inadmissible, and irrelevant, matter sought to be discovered might lead to other, and rele-

149. Much like its federal counterpart, CAL. CODE. CIV. PROC. §2016(b) provides:
Unless otherwise ordered by the court .... the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action .....
.It is not ground for objection that the testimony will
be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
CALIF. CODE CIV. PROC. §2019, which governs discovery through written interrogatories, adopts
by reference this same standard for the scope of inquiry.
150. CAL. EvrD. CODE. §352 reads: "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a)
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice,
of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury."
151. 119 Cal. App. 3d 516, 174 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1981).
152. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 525, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
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vant evidence. (See Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 56
Cal.2d 355, 390-393, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266.) "When compelled disclosure intrudes on constituionally protected areas, it cannot be justified solely on the ground that it may lead to relevant
information." And even when discovery of private information is
found directly relevant to the issues of ongoing litigation, it will not
be automatically allowed; there must be a "careful balancing" of
the "compelling public need" for discovery against the "fundamental right of privacy. [citations omitted] "13
Justice Elkington's statement requires some clarification. The citation
to Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court'14 modifies the preceding
sentence in a peculiar way. Greyhound held, in the passage cited, that
inquiry into facts that are inadmissible is still permissible when such
inquiry might lead to other evidence that is admissible.'" When Justice
Elkington refers to facts themselves "inadmissible, and irrelevant",
he must mean irrelevant in the sense of inadmissible or in the sense
of excludable at trial. Likewise, when the Justice later in the same
sentence speaks of justifying discovery on the ground that it "may
lead to other, and relevant, evidence," he must mean relevant in the
sense of (and to the extent) admissible at trial. The court in Greyhound
(in the cited passage) discussed only the question of admissibility at
trial as an objection to discovery. No statements were made by the
court respecting "relevance" in any sense independent of admissibility.
Section 2016(b) of the California Code of Civil Procedure is the only
statutory source of any right to discovery not withstanding the inadmissibility of the facts sought. In light of the language of Section
2016(b) as interpreted in Greyhound, Justice Elkington's statement
makes sense only to the extent he really means "admissible" when
he says "relevant".
Taken in this light, however, the sentence following the Greyhound
citation has a very cogent meaning for those interested in protecting
individuals from intrusive discovery inquiries. A clearer paraphrasing
of that sentence would indicate that, when compelled disclosure intrudes on constitutionally protected areas, it cannot be justified solely
on the ground that it may lead to admissible evidence. Actually, truly
vociferous advocates of privacy rights as against discovery might prefer
the word "relevant" in place of "admissible", since the set of facts

153.
154.
155.

Id.
56 Cal. 2d 355, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1961).
Id. at 391-93, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 108-10.
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admissible at trial is a subset of those relevant to the issues. However,
a completely literal reading of the opinion is not justified by Section
2016(b), its only possible source in the Code of Civil Procedure, nor
by the general thesis of Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court. The
foregoing, more restrained interpretation is the only logical one in
light of the statutes and authorities.
Understood in this way, the rule of this case furnishes effective
protection against even initial discovery inquiries into personal matters.
The clear negative implication of this rule is that discovery is not
permissible into private matters when the only justification is that
the discovery might yield admissible evidence. While the court does
not explicitly state it, the rationale of this rule must be that the state
interest in compelling disclosure of information is weaker when the
sole value of the information sought is that it might lead to other
information itself admissible. A strong state interest is clearly manifest
as to facts directly relevant to issues at trial, but that interest is lacking when the usefulness of the information sought is more speculative
and the likelihood of discovery of admissible evidence is minimal.
The authorities support this interpretation of California law. In
Board of Trustees, the court allowed discovery into the files only after
the names and identifying characteristics of the contributors had been
removed,' 5 6 but cases cited by Justice Elkington in the opinion were
even less sympathetic to the discovery sought. In Fults v. Superior
Court,'" the court of appeal flatly rejected interrogatories propounded
by a defendant in a paternity suit that inquired into the identity of
sexual partners around the probable date of conception. Using the
same line of reasoning as that found in Board of Trustees, the court
rejected the interrogatories in toto.'5 8 Similarly, in Morales v. Superior
Court,'"9 the identical argument was the basis of the rejection by the
court of interrogatories which inquired into the names, addresses, and
telephone numbers of individuals with whom a wrongful death plaintiff had had sexual relations during his marriage to his deceased spouse.
In both cases, the courts said "[w]hen compelled disclosure intrudes
on consitutionally protected areas, it cannot be justified solely on the
ground that it may lead to relevant information."' 6 0 Although this

156. 119 Cal. App. 3d 516, 532, 174 Cal. Rptr. 160, 168 (1980).
157. 88 Cal. App. 3d 899, 152 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1979).
158. Id. at 905, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
159. 99 Cal. App. 3d 283, 160 Cal. Rptr. (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 483-85),
194 (1979).
160. Id. at 288-89, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
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statement is borrowed from a United States Supreme Court case
decided in a much different context, in light of Article 1, Section
1, it should be read as a statement that discovery should not be allowed
when the only justification offered for it is that the discovery might
lead to admissible evidence.
CONCLUSION

Article 1, Section 1 of the California Constitution provides considerable protection for individuals who find that details of their private
lives have become a target of discovery. The drafters of the 1957
Civil Discovery Statutes originally envisioned that considerable
improvement in the efficiency and effectiveness of litigation could be
realized by allowing the parties to obtain discovery into all unprivileged
matters broadly relevant to the subject matter of the suit. In accordance with that premise, broad and sweeping access to information
was the object. The same can be said of the 1938 federal discovery
rules and the 1946 amendments thereto. Practice, however, shows this
outlook gives insufficient consideration to the privacy interests of individuals against whom intrusive inquiries are directed. Article 1,
Section 1 of the California State Constitution and less powerfully,
the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, provide a basis for
judicial protection of privacy interests as against intrusive discovery.
In both federal and state practice, a reasonably-held expectation of
privacy delimits the set of situations in which such a right arises;
various discrete indicators, other than mere intuition, provide guidance
as to when such reasonable expectations of privacy exist. Third parties
may claim their rights as well as litigants.
In both state and federal practice, courts are quick to grant protective orders limiting dissemination of the information sought or
obtained through discovery to the parties and their counsel and then
only for use in the instant litigation. In both systems, however, the
state interest in the ascertainment of truth in connection with judicial
proceedings ordinarily requires that intrusive inquiries be answered,
provided an appropriate protective order is available.
California practice, finally, differs from federal practice in that
California affords more opportunities for an individual to legitimately
refuse to answer intrusive discovery inquiries even when a protective
order limiting the dissemination of the answers might be entered. Just
as Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence should provide a basis
for refusal to answer inquiries into personal affairs, California decisional law interpreting Article 1, Section 1 can be read to the effect
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that such questions need not be answered when the only justification
for the inquiry is that it "might" lead to admissible evidence. Although
balancing the competing interests in factfinding and in privacy is
assuredly a difficult and problematical endeavor in many cases, the
latter undoubtedly should prevail when confronted by only a negligible or speculative interest in the former.

APPENDIX

A

Argument in Favor of Proposition 11
The proliferation of government snooping and data collecting is
threatening to destroy our traditional freedoms. Government agencies
seem to be competing to compile the most extensive sets of dossiers
of American citizens. Computerization of records makes it possible
to create "cradle-to-grave" profiles on every American.
At present there are no effective restraints on the information
activities of government and business. This amendment creates a legal
and enforceable right of privacy for every Californian.
The right of privacy is the right to be left alone. It is a fundamental and compelling interest. It protects our homes, our families, our
thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, our personalities, our freedom
of communion, and our freedom to associate with the people we
choose. It prevents government and business interests from collecting
and stock-piling unnecessary information about us and from misusing
information gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to embarass us.
Fundamental to our privacy is the ability to control circulation of
personal information. This is essential to social relationships and personal freedom. The proliferation of government and business records
over which we have no control limits our ability to control our personal lives. Often we do not know that these records even exist and
we are certainly unable to determine who has access to them.
Even more dangerous is the loss of control over the accuracy of
government and business records on individuals. Obviously if the person is unaware of the record, he or she cannot review the file and
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correct inevitable mistakes. Even if the existence of this information
is known, few government agencies or private businesses permit individuals to review their files and correct errors.
The average citizen also does not have control over what information is collected about him. Much is secretly collected. We are required
to report some information, regardless of our wishes for privacy or
our belief that there is no public need for the information. Each time
we apply for a credit card or a life insurancepolicy, file a tax return,
interview for a job, or get a driver's license, a dossier is opened and
an informationalprofile is sketched. Modern technology is capable
of monitoring, centralizing and computerizing this information which
eliminates any possibility of individual privacy.
The right of privacy is an important American heritage and essential to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. This right
should be abridged only when there is compelling public need. Some
information may remain as designated public records but only when
the availability of such information is clearly in the public interest.
Proposition 11 also guarantees that the right of privacy and our
other constitutional freedoms extend to all persons by amending Article
1 and substituting the term "people" for "men". There should be
no ambiguity about whether our constitutionalfreedoms arefor every
man, woman and child in this state.
KENNETH CORY

Assemblyman 69th District
George R. Moscone
State Senator, 10th District
Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 11
To say that there are at present no effective restraints on the information activities of government and business is simply untrue. In
addition to literally hundreds of laws restricting what use can be made
of information, every law student knows that the courts have long
protected privacy as one of the rights of our citizens.
Certainly, when we apply for credit cards, life insurance policies,
drivers' licenses, file tax returns or give business interviews, it is
absolutely essential that we furnish certain personal information. Proposition 11 does not mean that we will no longer have to furnish
it and provides no protection as to the use of the information that
the Legislature cannot give if it so desires.
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What Proposition 11 can and will do is to make far more difficult
what is already difficult enough under present law, investigating and
finding out whether persons receiving aid from various government
programs are truly needy or merely using welfare to augment their
income.
Proposition 11 can only be an open invitation to welfare fraud and
tax evasion and for this reason should be defeated.
JAMES

E. WHETMORE

State Senator, 35th District
Argument Against Proposition 11
Proposition 11, which adds the word "privacy" to a list of "inalienable rights" already enumerated in the Constituion, should be
defeated for several reasons.
To begin with, the present Constitution states that there are certain inalienable rights "among which are those" that it lists. Thus,
our Constitution does not attempt to list all of the inalienable rights
nor as a practical matter, could it do so. It has always been recognized
by the law and the courts that privacy is one of the rights we have,
particularly in the enjoyment of home and personal activities. So,
in the first place, the amendment is completely unnecessary.
For many years it has been agreed by scholars and attorneys that
it would be advantageous to remove much unnecessary wordage from
the Constitution, and at present we are spending a great deal of money
to finance a Constitution Revision Commission which is working to
do this. Its work presently is incomplete and we should not begin
to lengthen our Constitution and to amend it piecemeal until at least
the Commission has had a chance to finish its work.
The most important reason why the amendment should be defeated,
however, lies in an area where possibly privacy should not be completely guaranteed. Most govenment welfare programs are an attempt
by California's more fortunate citizens to assist those who are less
fortunate; thus, today, millions of persons are the beneficiaries of
government programs, based on the need of the recipient, which in
turn can only be judged by the revealing his income assets and general
ability to provide for himself.
If a person on welfare has his privacy protected to the point where
he need not reveal his assets and outside income, for example, how
could it be determined whether he should be given welfare at all?
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Suppose a person owned a house worth $100,000 and earned $50,000
a year from the operation of a business, but had his privacy protected to the point that he did not have to reveal any of this, and
thus qualified for and received welfare payments. Would this be fair
either to the taxpayers who pay for welfare or the truly needy who
would be deprived of part of their grant because of what the wealthy
person was receiving?
Our government is helping many people who really need and deserve
the help. Making privacy an inalienable right could only bring chaos
to all government benefit programs, thus depriving all of us, including
those who need the help most.
And so because it is unnecessary, interferes with the work presently
being done by the Constitution Revision Commission and would
emasculate all government programs based on recipient need, I urge
a "no" vote on Proposition 11.
JAMs

E. WHETmMoE

State Senator, 35 District
Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 11
The right to privacy is much more than "unnecessary wordage".
It is fundamental in any free society. Privacy is not now guaranteed
by our State Constitution. This simple amendment will extend various
court decisions on privacy to insure protection of our basic rights.
The work of the Constitution Revision Commission cannot be
destroyed by adding two words to the State Constitution. The
legislature actually followed the Commission's guidelines in drafting
Proposition 11 by keeping the change simple and to the point. Of
all the proposed constitutional amendments before you, this is the
simplest, the most understandable, and one of the most important.
The right to privacy will not destroy welfare nor undermine any
important government program. It is limited by "compelling public
necessity" and the public's need to know. Proposition 11 will not
prevent the government from collecting any information it legitimately
needs. It will only prevent misuse of this information for unauthorized
purposes and preclude the collection of extraneous or frivolous
information.
KENNETH CORY

Assemblyman, 69th District
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